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2018 electoral breakthrough in Malaysia
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ABSTRACT
In May 2018, the Malaysian opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan or Hope Alliance won
the federal elections for the first time in the history of the country. The electoral
authoritarian system is now in a state of transition. The electoral breakthrough was the
result of longer-term socio-economic transformations, but the formation of a strong
pre-electoral coalition was ultimately decisive for the victory. The article compares
various coalitions and their performance during seven elections since 1990. The
structured, focused comparison analyses the coalitions during this period because prior
to 1990 the opposition was fragmented. On the basis of a three-level concept
regarding the strength of pre-electoral coalitions, the article argues that Pakatan
Harapan was successful because the coalition was sufficiently comprehensive (as
indicated by the number and the competitiveness of candidates), cohesive (concerning
ideological proximity and behavioural routinization) and well-rooted in society (in
terms of linkages to voters/supporters and to civil society networks or organizations).
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Introduction
Especially within the institutional framework of electoral authoritarianism, opposition
coalitions are in most cases fragile. They are under permanent attack by the regime,
threatened by party bans, restricted by repressive laws, and seduced by co-optation.
Nevertheless, they sometimes succeed against all odds. Which opposition coalitions
have the best chance of winning elections in authoritarian systems? Whereas there is
ample literature on coalitions built after elections (with reference to their size and com-
position, for example), there is astoundingly little on those established before the polls1,
although democratization by elections as a specific type of transition is increasingly
important.2 This article seeks to fill this gap and to introduce a parsimonious three-
level concept regarding the strength of pre-electoral coalitions. Malaysia is a very illu-
minating case study in this respect. The opposition has worked together under different
circumstances over a period of approximately three decades, but this cooperation has
been particularly intensive since the late 1990s.
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From independence until 2018, Malaysia was a competitive authoritarian regime3
with a multiparty system and semi-competitive elections. Measuring in terms of politi-
cal rights and civil liberties, Freedom House has ranked Malaysia as “partly free” for the
last few decades. Repression has been used systematically, though generally more mildly
than in fully authoritarian states. The major electoral manipulations were gerrymander-
ing and malapportionment, the latter to the advantage of rural Malay voters and East
Malaysian constituencies.4 Moreover, the ruling coalition used the “three Ms” –
media, money and the bureaucratic machine – to its advantage. Opposition parties
may have ruled in some states, but centralism was so strong that the state governments
were very much dependent on Kuala Lumpur.5 Within the Barisan Nasional (BN), the
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) was clearly dominant. The party con-
trolled the state administration, including government-linked corporations (GLCs) and
its own business empire.6 While it was dependent on the Malaysian Chinese Associ-
ation (MCA) for campaign financing during the first few elections, it later became
the richest party in the country by far.7
Coalitions are so important in Malaysia because the plurality electoral system makes
it necessary to seek allies. Only if coalescing parties nominate one, and only one, can-
didate do they have a chance of winning a majority of seats. Individual parties can only
win a majority at the state level and in a range of federal constituencies; an example was
the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia, PAS) in 2018. In that year, after
more than six decades, the ruling coalition in Malaysia lost the federal elections for the
first time. The opposition coalition Hope Alliance or Pakatan Harapan (PH) won
because it was a sufficiently cohesive and comprehensive coalition, and because it
had demonstrated its administrative capabilities in Selangor and Penang and could
mobilize voters via close linkages to well-organized civil society groups. In comparison
to all the previous federal elections, all the necessary conditions to produce an electoral
breakthrough converged for the first time in May 2018.
This article’s main contribution is the development of a generalizable concept on the
strength of pre-electoral coalitions in electoral authoritarian systems by means of a
comparison of such coalitions in Malaysia after independence. It also wants to
answer the question how and why the electoral breakthrough in Malaysia came
about. It first outlines the basic concept and explicates the elements “comprehensive-
ness,” “cohesion” and “rootedness.” It shows that in 2018 the pre-electoral coalition
was stronger than the coalitions before. It then discusses the development of opposition
coalitions since 1957, but especially since 1990. The conclusion evaluates the concept
against the background of Malaysian experiences. The cohesiveness has been raised
in 2008 with an increasing number of competitive candidates (in contrast to previous
elections), and again in 2018 with the inclusion of a party based in East Malaysia. Cohe-
siveness in 2018 was “very strong” with the highest degree of ideological proximity due
to the absence of an Islamist party and a very strong behavioural routinization (like in
2008 and 2013) with respect to campaign coordination, the candidate selection process,
etc. And “rootedness” was strongest in 2018 due to the activities of civil society and the
linkages to voters and supporters in Penang and Selangor.
The concept: the strength of pre-electoral coalitions
The literature offers a range of reasons why rulers in authoritarian regimes rely on elec-
tions.8 Like regime parties and parliaments, elections appear to prolong the tenure of
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autocratic systems. They help strengthen the dominant party or coalition because party
members unite during the campaigns and are driven by common interests. The party
leader is able to utilize candidacies not only to forge close relations to subordinates
and to deter defection, but also to identify how loyal supporters are; this may also
serve to efficiently divide the spoils among the ruling coalition and is conducive to
avoiding violent removal from office. More importantly, the regime may use the polls
to forge close ties to the electorate through vote-buying and patronage. Elections can
facilitate the splitting of the opposition by dividing those factions willing to acknowl-
edge the legitimacy of elections, even though they are unfair, from those who are
more fundamentally opposed.
In the same vein, the “electoral model” by Bunce andWolchik hints at the potentially
liberalizing effects of elections in authoritarian systems.9 These effects include activities
such as
orchestrating large-scale voter-registration and turnout drives; forming a united opposition,
linked to NGOs, that campaigns ambitiously throughout the country; making extensive use
of rallies, rock concerts, street theater, and alternative media; and pressuring regimes to
improve the quality and transparency of electoral procedures through domestic and inter-
national election monitoring and parallel vote tabulation.10
Such activities may lead to electoral breakthroughs. But how can we conceptualize the
strength of such coalitions? It is useful to look at the literature on party and party system
institutionalization. Randall and Svåsand11, for example, measure party institutionaliza-
tion with reference to “systemness” (organizational strength), “decisional autonomy”
(decisions are not influenced by charismatic individuals or financiers and are protected
from arbitrary state intervention), “value infusion” (identification with the platform and
principles), and “reification” (reputation and visibility). In a similar vein, Levitsky12
conceptualizes party institutionalization with reference to “value infusion,” which
encompasses linkages to civil and religious organizations13 as well as reification and
legitimation, and to “behavioural routinization,” which consists of stable patterns of
organization as well as independence from powerful leaders or financiers. Most of
the party institutionalization literature mentions such recurrent features. Well-institu-
tionalized parties need to be rooted in society, a quality indicated by links to civil society
and voters. They should be autonomous not only from single individuals, but also from
external interventions. They should be behaviourally routinized and organizationally
strong.
With respect to these insights, the core concept “strength of pre-electoral coalition”
(see Figure 1) used in this article has three dimensions.14 A strong coalition is highly
comprehensive, very cohesive and well-rooted. These three necessary elements are
jointly sufficient for the strength of the pre-electoral coalition.15
Figure 1. The concept of pre-electoral coalitions.
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Comprehensiveness is defined not only by the number of candidates, but also by
their competitiveness. In order to win, a pre-electoral coalition needs to cover all or a
great majority of constituencies with one, and only one, adequate candidate; this
means not just any candidate, but someone who is “known and seen among the electo-
rate”16 and able to properly represent the constituency. Indicators of competitiveness
are the ethnic, religious and social backgrounds of candidates: Does he/she represent
large parts of the population in the area? Is the person a “parachute” candidate or
someone who has lived in the area for a long time and intimately knows the everyday
problems of voters. Is he/she well-known in the constituency – for example, according
to surveys – and seen as trustworthy? “Very weak” comprehensiveness would denote a
very small coalition with few adequate candidates, “very strong” a very broad coalition
with capable candidates.
The cohesiveness of a pre-electoral coalition is indicated by ideological proximity
and by behavioural routinization. The former is characterized, for example, by a
common platform, and by coalition partners trusting each other and being able to
speak with one voice. The opposition also has to be capable of defining itself as a
clear alternative to the current government and has to convincingly argue that it will
institute a new regime (this is much more than just “value infusion”). The latter is
characterized by frequent meetings of party leaders, the discussion of major issues,
the peaceful settling of disputes and the coordination of joint activities such as cam-
paigning.17 Pre-electoral coalitions are, almost by definition, loosely structured. In
order to win elections, a strong machine is helpful, but can be compensated for, for
example, by personalities who are able to bridge existing divisions or by voluntary sup-
porters only superficially integrated into the coalition.
Rootedness denotes existing links to voters and supporters as well as links to civil
society groups. The idea is that well-rooted coalitions have opportunities to mobilize
voters, to have an impact on the public discourse via social media, and even to
influence the agenda of civil society organizations – for example, if these groups
organize large-scale demonstrations. If the coalition has governed at the state level,
for instance, it also has the means to build clientelistic links to voters or to wealthy sup-
porters. A coalition that is isolated from huge parts of the public will be less successful in
elections. One indicator of rootedness is the degree of popularity in the country. Are
there clientelist linkages to voters and supporters – for example, because MPs and
assemblypersons provide help, distribute patronage goods, etc. in their constituencies?
Are political parties in power at the state level perceived as governing successfully? Are
the coalition members able to mobilize supporters for online and offline campaigns and
for funding?
This article uses this concept to assess the salience of pre-electoral coalitions in seven
consecutive Malaysian elections at the national level. The selection of these cases allows
for a focused, controlled comparison. The study is based on newspaper articles, party
publications, field research during the elections that have taken place since 2004, and
interviews. The coding is based on an ordinal scale from 0 (very weak) to 1 (very
strong) for the indicators.
Because I am interested in electoral breakthroughs as the outcome variable,
coalitions need to encompass enough parties and candidates in order to have a
chance to win. Therefore, the dimension “comprehensiveness” has been added to the
two other dimensions “cohesiveness” and “rootedness.” “Rootedness” is a common
dimension in the party institutionalization literature, while “cohesiveness” is partly
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derived from “value infusion,” “behavioural routinization” and/or “systemness.” Since
coalitions work differently than individual parties (and party system institutionalization
covers whole party systems), “cohesiveness” covers a type of combined institutionaliza-
tion of coalition partners. The coalition needs “value infusion” while avoiding a hetero-
geneous platform. The organizational strength of the coalition, moreover, needs to
encompass the individual parties as well as the cooperation among them.
Pre-electoral coalitions from 1957 until 1995
By the time Malaya gained independence in 1957, a once strong Communist Party had
almost been decimated; two smaller socialist parties, the predominantly ethnic Malay
Parti Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Party, PRM) and the ethnic Chinese-domi-
nated Labour Party, combined forces in the Socialist Front. However, they were unable
to win more than eight and two seats in the 1959 and 1964 elections, respectively. At the
federal level the Alliance, consisting of UMNO, MCA and the Malaysian Indian Con-
gress (MIC), was able to sustain a two-thirds majority in the 1959 and 1964 elections.
PAS, at that time more a Malay nationalist than an Islamist party, won majorities in
state assemblies only in the economically backward north. Pre-electoral coalitions
between PAS and other parties still did not exist. In the May 1969 elections the dom-
inance of the Alliance was considerably shaken, even though the Labour Party had boy-
cotted the polls.18 Unexpectedly, the Alliance won only 74 of 144 seats at the federal
level and 48.4% of the votes in West Malaysia. One reason was the expanded franchise
for non-Malays. The multi-ethnic but predominantly ethnic-Chinese Parti Gerakan and
the social democratic, also predominantly ethnic-Chinese Democratic Action Party
(DAP) attracted many of these non-Malay voters. In a few states, opposition parties
even gained majorities. However, opposition coalitions did not materialize.
The polarization between UMNO and the opposition parties representing different
ethnic groups during the campaign led to riots just after the elections. As a result, a state
of emergency was proclaimed (until 1971). In the early 1970s, the Alliance expanded the
coalition to become the BN. It even co-opted PAS for a few years. In addition, it
strengthened UMNO financially and organizationally and used authoritarian measures
to stifle civil society and political party opposition. The opposition learned that without
a cohesive coalition, election success would be unlikely in the future. Yet given the
increased authoritarianism, it was very difficult to enhance cooperation in the 1970s
and 1980s.
The BN won at least 83% of the seats in the national parliament in the 1974, 1978,
1982 and 1986 elections, against an opposition consisting largely of PAS (since 1978)
and DAP.19 It is puzzling that until 1990, coalition-building within the opposition
was an almost complete failure, despite the necessity of avoiding three-cornered
fights. The reasons for this included strong ethnic and religious cleavages, a largely
depoliticized and weak civil society, and the lack of a realistic chance to overthrow
the government electorally. DAP and PAS were oriented towards their respective elec-
torates: the DAP fought mainly against the MCA while PAS fought UMNO, within
what was essentially a “bilateral opposition.”20
However, during the mid-1980s a part of the opposition established a loose alliance.
It was followed by two coalitions formed in 1990 that were interlinked through Seman-
gat ‘46, a party that had split from UMNO in the wake of a battle between two factions
in 1986/87.21 A critical element in the formation of the two coalitions was the active role
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of former UMNO leader Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah as a bridging personality.22 Tengku
Razaleigh Hamzah was able to connect the divergent forces and to build trust among
voters because he had substantial governing experience. One alliance, the Islamic
Muslim Unity Movement (Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah, APU), was a coalition of
Semangat ‘46 with PAS. The other, the People’s Front (Rakyat Malaysia, GR), consisted
of Semangat ‘46, the PRM and the DAP, amongst others. Such an unorthodox construc-
tion of two parallel pacts was largely the result of programmatic differences between
PAS and the DAP. Ultimately, the opposition won 49 of 180 seats in 1990 (in 1986:
29 of 177 seats). The BN achieved only 53.4% of the votes, its worst result since the
debacle in 1969.
The APU/GR coalition construction was innovative and relatively comprehensive,
but not well-rooted – with the exception of PAS’s association with Islamic milieus
and Semangat’s old UMNO links. Its cohesiveness was restricted because DAP and
PAS communicated via Semangat ‘46. The two alliances ultimately collapsed due to a
range of disagreements. Religious and ethnic cleavages complicated the creation of a
cohesive coalition (ideological proximity and behavioural routinization are thus rated
“weak” or 0.25, see Table 1). At that time, pre-electoral coalitions had no experience
governing at the state level and civil society was still relatively weak (both assessed at
0.25, see Table 1).
In the 1995 elections the BN won 162 out of 192 seats and more than 65% of the
votes against an emaciated opposition consisting only of the APU.23 The APU was
“very weak” in terms of comprehensiveness, while its cohesion was arguably stronger
than in 1990, but only because it was a relatively small coalition. Its links to voters
and civil society were restricted to smaller Islamic communities and networks.
As long as the opposition was largely disunited in terms of programmes, strategies
and organization, voters did not perceive elections as an effective way to bring about
Table 1. The strength of pre-electoral coalitions in Malaysia since 1990.
Notes: 0: very weak; 0.25: weak; 0.50: intermediate; 0.75: strong; 1.0: very strong.
1990: APU (or Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah: Semangat ‘46 and PAS) and GR (or Gagasan Rakyat: Seman-
gat ‘46, DAP, PRM).
1995: APU.
1999: BA (Barisan Alternatif): PKN, PRM, DAP and PAS.
2004: DAP withdrew from BA in September 2001.
2008 and 2013: PR (Pakatan Rakyat): PKR, DAP and PAS. In 2008 as an informal coalition.
2018: PH (Pakatan Harapan): PKR, DAP, Bersatu, Amanah and Warisan; PAS formed another coalition with
some smaller parties.
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a change in government. They were merely a means to correct certain government pol-
icies or to teach UMNO or one of its coalition partners a lesson.
Opposition coalitions from Reformasi until 2013
The 1999 election and the Barisan Alternatif
It was not until the 1999 elections that electoral victory for the opposition at the federal
level appeared to be somewhat realistic.24 When Deputy PrimeMinister Anwar Ibrahim
was arrested at the height of the economic and financial crisis of 1998/99 due to his
quarrel with Mahathir over policy issues, but presumably also over the UMNO leader-
ship, a broad Reformasi movement consisting of both civil society activists and opposi-
tion parties emerged. Over several months, this movement organized rallies and street
demonstrations. Ahead of the 1999 elections, DAP, PAS and the newly established Parti
Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party, later renamed Parti Keadilan Rakyat,
People’s Justice Party, PKR) even founded a pre-electoral coalition that included
secular and Islamist forces: the Alternative Front or Barisan Alternatif (BA). This
was the first time in Malaysian history that such a strong alliance encompassing such
unlikely bedfellows had been created. Arguably, an effective opposition needs transfor-
mational objectives in order to mobilize its supporters and potential voters. In order to
water down once salient issues such as ethnic and religious antagonisms, a common
platform that transcended all these primordial issues was formulated.25
In 1999, the BA was already quite comprehensive and had competitive candidates
(both rated at 0.50, see Table 1), but East Malaysia was only tentatively covered by com-
petitive candidates. It can be argued that cohesiveness was still at an intermediate level,
because DAP and PAS were seen as unlikely partners. The PKN was a new party and
hardly institutionalized. The coalition partners did not know each other well.
Cooperation was difficult – for example, in terms of candidate selection – and ideologi-
cal tensions were simmering.26 The BA had “very strong” linkages to the Reformasi civil
society movement, and the PKN had a number of influential NGO activists in its
ranks.27 All in all, the BA was the strongest opposition coalition with the aim of radi-
cally transforming the polity (in contrast to the APU and GR) to date, but it was still
much too weak to decisively challenge the BN’s hegemony.
The BA won 80 of the 222 seats in the national parliament, despite the usual gerry-
mandering and malapportionment as well as more direct forms of repression, especially
the incarceration of Anwar Ibrahim. The economic crisis began to subside at the time of
the elections and many voters still did not trust the coalition’s ability to govern the
country. Ethnic Chinese and ethnic Indian voters were still very sceptical with
respect to the radicals within PAS, and thus the DAP was unable to strengthen its par-
liamentary representation. Besides, a few top DAP leaders such as Lim Kit Siang and
Karpal Singh lost in their constituencies.28
The collapse of the BA and the 2004 elections
The BA’s weakness was demonstrated after the elections when PAS radicalized its dis-
course on the Islamization of the country and the programmatic discrepancies between
the Islamists and the liberal democrats became irreconcilable. The coalition collapsed in
2001, when the DAP could no longer tolerate PAS’s shift towards an Islamic state
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concept. Instigated by provocations from Mahathir, PAS had published the Islamic
State Document, which the DAP could not accept. The BN was very adroit in
fanning the flames of conflict within the opposition, but the latter’s dissolution was
at least as much a result of its inability to form a cohesive coalition. In accordance
with Brownlee’s prediction regarding the stabilizing power of strong ruling parties,
UMNO’s survival strategies after 1999 appeared to work.29 In 2003, Abdullah Badawi
succeeded Mahathir as prime minister, at a time when the opposition was already in
shambles and the economy had recovered. In the 2004 elections, only PKR and PAS
cooperated to an extent, without DAP. The BN won 64.4% of the votes and secured
198 of 219 seats in the Dewan Rakyat as well as 505 of 552 seats in the state assemblies.
UMNO candidates won in 109 of 117 constituencies at the national level. This appeared
to be almost the end of the opposition. Among the reasons for the victory, observers also
identified Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s popularity as a softly spoken, respectable
orthodox Muslim and a cautious reformer.
In 2004, the coalition covered only parts of Western Malaysia and was therefore not
comprehensive (it was less comprehensive than in 1999, but still more comprehensive
than the APU in 1995) (rated at 0.25, see Table 1). Candidates in East Malaysia were
isolated and did not receive much support from the BA. Without the DAP, the coalition
was much weaker in urban areas than in 1999. Moreover, voters did not expect the BA
to win. The BA’s platform was therefore unconvincing. The coalition still had links to
civil society, but the Reformasi movement was clearly less influential than in 1999
(assessed here at 0.50, see Table 1).
In 2004, after the elections, Anwar Ibrahim was released from prison. Within PAS,
reformers willing to cooperate with the DAP and Anwar obtained a range of leadership
positions. In 2007, unforeseen mass protests by organizations such as the Coalition for
Clean and Fair Elections (Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil or Bersih) and the
Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) helped forge close links between political
parties and civil society.30
The Pakatan Rakyat and the 2008 elections
Although the political uncertainty was palpable at that time, the March 2008 elections
were perceived in Malaysia as a “political tsunami” with surprising and, for UMNO and
its partners, even shocking results.31 BN lost its two-thirds majority, while the opposi-
tion won 82 of 222 seats in the national parliament and formed governments in five of
13 states, among them the economic powerhouses Penang and Selangor. In West
Malaysia only 35% of the ethnic Chinese and 48% of the ethnic Indian populations
voted for BN candidates.
There was no formal pre-electoral coalition, but the opposition parties had reached a
consensus in February 2008 to avoid “three-cornered fights” in almost all constituen-
cies.32 During the campaign, politicians from DAP and PKR as well as from PKR
and PAS appeared together at events. Each of the main opposition parties had its
own manifesto, but the platforms were compatible and had the common theme of
“change.”33
In general, cohesion can be considered relatively solid if the respective parties coor-
dinate their campaigns and the candidacies. The next step is formalized cooperation
under the banner of a united coalition. On 1 April 2008, the People’s Alliance
(Pakatan Rakyat, PR) – again consisting of DAP, PAS and the PKR – was formed.
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The victories in five different states had forced the parties to collaborate more closely
because they needed some form of power-sharing.34 In forming the People’s Alliance
they steered clear of terms such as “opposition” or “alternative.”
The coalition partners had built more trust and were well aware of each other’s sen-
sitivities. In 2008, the PR was more professional than the BA, covering almost all con-
stituencies with strong candidates (with the exception of Sarawak and Sabah; it is
therefore rated at 0.75 for both comprehensiveness indicators, see Table 1). With
Anwar Ibrahim the PR had a unifying charismatic figure adroitly bringing DAP and
PAS together.
The resurgence of civil society activism with Bersih and HINDRAF was testimony to
close links between parties and activists. In 1999, the linkages to civil society were “very
strong” because the unprecedented Reformasi movement was directly connected to
Anwar Ibrahim and his party, but also to DAP and PAS. At the time the movement
was enormously enthusiastic and powerful. Since 2008 civil society movements, for
example Bersih, were more organized, less close to political parties, but also “very
strong” making it very difficult for the regime to prevent mass rallies (see Table 1).
There was a dialectic of partisan and civil society opposition; sometimes they were
closely related, sometimes separated to allow for an effective division of labour.
Bersih was formed in 2005 and held its first mass rally in November 2007. It had to
a large extent been a movement formed and dominated by political parties. Sub-
sequently, it emancipated itself from partisan influence and gained a life of its own.35
It was reasonable to political parties to take a back seat, because whenever the regime
demonized the Bersih protesters, the parties could keep a certain distance.36 Bersih
was the focal point of the civil society opposition and capable of integrating diverse
voices. With Bersih, the “organizational capabilities of opposition forces”37 were
much greater than ever before. Moreover, the group’s main objectives were directly
linked to the political agendas of opposition parties.
The Pakatan Rakyat and the 2013 elections
The dismal BN performance in 2008 led to internal crises within BN parties, particu-
larly within UMNO. Abdullah Badawi was forced to resign in 2009. The new prime
minister, Najib Razak, then sought to portray himself as a reformer. For example, he
abolished the notorious Internal Security Act (ISA) and announced a reform of the
Sedition Act. He tried to open up the economy at the cost of some Malay privileges
and introduced a range of pro-poor policies. His main agenda was to weaken the PR.
For a time his approval ratings were indeed quite good, but the 2013 elections again
demonstrated the BN’s fundamental problems, especially on the part of a few smaller
UMNO coalition partners, in mobilizing support.38
In 2013 the PR structure was almost the same as in 2008. Yet in 2013, behavioural
routinization was arguably higher because of long-term cooperation at the federal and
state levels. Since the coalition had won in five states in 2008, it was experienced and
able to establish better institutionalized links to voters (see Table 1).
In 2013, Pakatan Rakyat thus won 89 federal seats, 229 out of 505 state mandates,
and almost 51% of the total vote.39 Ideological proximity in 2008 and 2013 was stronger
than in 1999 because the coalition members were more experienced in dealing with
each other and the reform faction within PAS was more powerful and better able to
bridge the divide between PAS and DAP.40
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The opposition was strong because of the behavioural routinization among the core
parties. Linkages to civil society groups were facilitated by new means of communi-
cation. Moreover, in terms of ideological proximity, there was a palpable convergence:
DAP… set aside issues of Chinese culture, language, and education and… recruited and fielded
some prominent Malay members as candidates… . In parallel, PAS replaced its Islamic State
Document of 2004 with a Negara Berkebajikan (Welfare state) proposal for GE12. By the
latter, less discordant and more inclusive, ideological realignment, PAS strengthened PR’s
claim of being dedicated to “justice, good governance, transparency, accountability and
human rights” – causes that could transcend ethnocentric and religious considerations.41
The 2013 results showed that rural Malay voters were most important for UMNO’s sur-
vival. The BN received 61.6% of the ethnic Malay votes, and UMNO candidates
achieved majorities in 78 out of 99 rural Malay constituencies, whereas UMNO’s
junior partners MCA, MIC, and Gerakan lost most of their seats. Ethnic Chinese
voters in particular opted for opposition parties, prompting BN politicians to speak
of a “Chinese Tsunami” and accusing minorities of being ungrateful. The 2013 elections
had shown that incremental, protracted democratization via a series of elections might
indeed be possible.
In some states electoral breakthroughs indeed came about through a series of elec-
tions. The best examples were Selangor and Penang; once the opposition won these
states, a path dependency was established and it was very difficult for the BN to
win them back.42 Penang was ruled for a very long time by Gerakan. Gerakan
began as an opposition party in 1969 and had been part of the BN since the early
1970s, but it lost in Penang in 2008. UMNO and the MCA were incapable of substi-
tuting for Gerakan in Penang after 2008. The DAP took over the state government in
2008, demonstrated its ability to run it, and won again in 2013 with a large majority. In
Selangor, the PKR has led the government since 2008 and has also strengthened its
position since taking power. In this vein, Dettman and Weiss43 stress the growing
embeddedness of these parties on the ground with the help of clientelistic links to
voters. PR has been able to underline its competence in terms of economic growth
and better governance, but has also distributed benefits such as free water, shuttle
buses and cash transfers.
The electoral breakthrough of 2018
The formation of Pakatan Harapan
After the 2013 elections, it was important for Najib to deal with the political threat of
Anwar, to split the opposition by approaching PAS, and to scapegoat the DAP.44 He
portrayed the 2013 elections as a “Chinese tsunami” and criticized the ethnic Chinese
minority for its alleged lack of thankfulness. In early 2014, Anwar was sentenced to
five years imprisonment on the basis of trumped-up charges. This incarceration was
probably the reason PAS changed its course.45 PAS leaders obviously saw no real
chance of winning at the federal level and thus decided to focus on state-level elections.
To them, there was always a trade-off between stressing an Islamist agenda in order to
win in Kelantan and Terengganu or toning down its rhetoric as a way to approach
DAP and PKR.46
At the PAS congress in June 2015, a reformist faction was unsuccesful in elections for
leadership positions. This “Erdoğan faction” had always supported coalitions with the
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other opposition parties and was ready to compromise on issues such as expanding
Islamic law or insisting on the establishment of an (usually ill-defined) Islamic
state.47 The ruthless marginalization at the congress prompted the reformers to form
a new party, the Parti Amanah Negara (or: Amanah), in September 2015. A few days
later, the Hope Alliance or Pakatan Harapan (PH), consisting of Amanah, DAP and
PKR, was formed. Yet to most observers PH without PAS did not have the necessary
Malay-Muslim support, especially in the rural Malay heartland.
In February 2016, Mukhriz, Mahathir’s son, was sacked as chief minister of Kedah.
Mahathir left UMNO in the same month. In March 2016, he and opposition politicians
signed a 37-point People’s Declaration that called for Najib’s resignation. A few days
before, he had met Anwar at the Kuala Lumpur High Court to attend the hearing of
an application challenging the National Security Council (NSC) Act 2016. The
widely publicized meeting had signified the realignment of archenemies.
The political temperature increased when Mahathir established the United Pribumi
Party of Malaysia (Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia, PPBM) or Bersatu on 9 September
2016. On 13 December 2016, Bersatu formed an electoral pact with PH, and in mid-
March 2017 it joined the coalition as a full member. Although new coalition partners
such as Bersatu made communication difficult at the beginning, behavioural routiniza-
tion is rated here as “very strong” because of increasingly stabilized interaction patterns
sustained by respectable bridging personalities and brought about by a common, potent
transformational objective (see Table 1).48
In July 2017, Mahathir became PH chairman and in January 2018 was even declared
the candidate for prime minister, with Anwar Ibrahim his designated successor. This
pact between Mahathir and Anwar was most decisive in assuring the old Reformasi acti-
vists that Mahathir would only be an interim prime minister and that Anwar would take
over some time after his release from prison.49 Mahathir’s role as a unifying figure and
“a single veto player for the entire protest movement,” who aggregated the movement’s
preferences into a coherent agenda,50 cannot be overestimated.51 The regime elites
could not dare to incarcerate Mahathir, who was seen as the father of the impressive
economic development of the last decades and the grey eminence of UMNO.52 Najib
himself had become prime minister in 2009 because, among other reasons, Mahathir
had trusted and favoured him as Abdullah Badawi’s replacement.
In parallel to the partisan coalition-building, civil society activists were still focused
on electoral reform. In contrast to the past, the police refrained from exerting much
coercion during the large Bersih 4 and Bersih 5 protests that took place in August
2015 and November 2016. Even Mahathir attended the rallies and thereby signalled
his commitment to an agenda of radical reform. The Bersih 5 demonstrations were pre-
ceded by a Bersih Convoy across the country in order to spread the message beyond
Kuala Lumpur. According to Khoo53 the opposition “developed viable, cohesive, and
extensive networks of dissent” and was able to “build an inclusive political platform”
that led to “firm electoral support for a two-coalition system.”
Bersih worked according to the logic of Bunce and Wolchik’s electoral model. These
authors’ comparative, in-depth study substantiates the supposition that the vulner-
ability of regimes matters, as do
variations in the willingness and capacity of oppositions to exploit that vulnerability – in par-
ticular, whether they coalesce with one another and whether they deploy other electoral strat-
egies that make them more competitive at the polls and, if necessary, in the streets.54
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In addition, the PH worked together with HINDRAF as a so-called strategic partner.
Without the indirect support of Bersih and civil society organizations via street demon-
strations and social media, the continuing politicization of scandals, and the criticism of
unfair electoral practices, the 2018 breakthrough would not have been possible.
The 2018 electoral victory
In the 2018 election campaign the ruling coalition pointed to the overall good economic
indicators – growth was at 5.9% in 2017 – and to the many welfare benefits they had
distributed as part of the 1Malaysia campaign55. According to the BN, only they
could guarantee political stability, while an opposition victory would lead to chaos.56
Although stagnant wages, rising costs, corruption (1MDB),57 and the Goods and Ser-
vices Tax (GST) were important issues during the campaign,58 it is reasonable to
state that the BN did not lose because of a marked economic crisis.59
Arguably, with respect to individual items the PH’s manifesto was more comprehen-
sive and clearer than the previous opposition platforms.60 The PH’s demands included
the abolition of the extremely unpopular and relatively new GST, a term limit for the
prime minister, the restructuring of the overly powerful Prime Minister’s Office, and
reforms to the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the electoral
system, the abolition of repressive security laws, and the establishment of an Indepen-
dent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission. Mahathir focused on the GST
and 1MDB and questioned the usefulness of credit-financed mega-projects such as
the construction of the East Coast Rail Link undertaken by state-owned companies
in the People’s Republic of China. The platform was directed not simply at improving
government policies, but at fundamentally reversing them and altering the political
system as a whole. In contrast to previous elections, when PAS’s commitment to estab-
lishing an Islamic state was only put on hold, this time the coalition partners were able
to reach a consensus on all major reforms. The Islamic state issue, which had always
been problematic for the BA and the PR, especially with respect to the ethnic
Chinese and ethnic Indian voters, was no longer an issue in 2018, except in some
parts of Northern Malaysia.
In many ways the splitting of the PR brought about the electoral breakthrough in
May 2018. One major reason for this breakthrough was the PH’s ideological proximity
and enhanced programmatic cohesion.61 The PH was not officially recognized by the
Registrar of Societies as a political coalition. Therefore, all coalition partners agreed
not to use the common PH logo but rather that of the PKR. Because of a new regulation,
the opposition had to cut Mahathir’s image from its billboards. Arguably, all these
measures were counterproductive and strengthened the cohesion of the coalition. In
addition, the PH formed an electoral pact with the Sabah Heritage Party (Parti
Warisan Sabah or: Warisan). Warisan’s president, Shafie Apdal, formerly an UMNO
member, was an important ally in the attempt to win seats in East Malaysia, where
the BN had been dominant even in the 2008 and 2013 elections. Warisan’s shift to
the PH (like that of Bersatu and Amanah) can be interpreted as broadening the com-
prehensiveness of the pre-electoral coalition and more than counterbalancing the loss of
PAS. The opposition was able to field very strong candidates in many Sarawakian and
Sabah constituencies, in contrast to all previous elections.
The PH’s mobilizational capacities were confirmed by a relatively high voter turnout
of 82.3%. PH won nearly half the vote and 113 of the 222 seats, 47 of which went to PKR,
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42 toDAP, 13 to Bersatu and 11 toAmanah. In addition,Warisan attained eight seats. BN
received less than 34% of the vote nationwide and 79 seats in the national parliament. Of
these, 54 went to UMNO and 13 to the ruling party in Sarawak, the Parti Pesaka Bumi-
putera Bersatu (United Bumiputera Heritage Party, PBB). The other twoWestMalaysian
BN parties, MIC with 2 seats and MCA with only one mandate hardly played a role. The
third coalition, which consisted mainly of PAS, obtained 16.6% of the votes and received
18 mandates, especially in the northern, mostly Malay-Muslim states of Kelantan and
Terengganu. According to the Merdeka Centre,62 95% of the ethnic Chinese population
and 70%–75% of the ethnic Indians voted for PH. The ethnicMalay vote, in contrast, was
split between PH (25%–30%), BN (35%–40%) and PAS (30%–33%). According to
Ostwald, Schuler and Jie, counterfactual election simulations show that the three-cor-
nered fights were not decisive for the PH’s victory. One reason for this is the regional
dimension of Malaysian elections, with “two two-way fights on the peninsula: first
between BN and Pakatan Harapan along the west coast and the south; and second
between BN and PAS in the north and east.”63 Mahathir and Bersatu were instrumental
in eroding the ethnic Malay support for UMNO.64
The opposition gainedmost from the emergence and spread of social media channels,
including blogs, YouTube and Internet news sites such as Malaysiakini, etc. After the
2008 elections, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi had conceded that the government
had been ill-prepared for campaigning on the Internet. Afterwards, the BN engaged
so-called cybertroopers, that is Internet trolls and propagandists, in order to counter
online attacks by the opposition. Nevertheless, according to Tapsell65, during the 2018
elections increased smartphone usage helped undermine authoritarian rule. In that
year, over 70% of Malaysians had Internet access, mostly via smartphones. There were
22 million Facebook users and even in the semi-rural and rural areas Facebook and
WhatsApp were the most important means of gathering and spreading information.
The Internet was far less censored than print media,66 and even an Anti-Fake News
Law could not prevent netizens from attacking the government. The Internet facilitated
communication among civil society and political party activists as well as the wider
public, in particular the swelling group of young voters. Invoke Malaysia, for example,
headed by PKR politician Rafizi Ramli, proclaims it managed the social media accounts
of 103 PH candidates, recruited 42,000 volunteers to support PH candidates, mobilized
tens of thousands of polling and counting agents, and conducted more than 50 different
surveys. An example of the enthusiasm of opposition supporters was the Facebook group
called “GE 14: Postal Voters Discussion” that organized the distribution of sealed ballots
from overseas voters via runners to polling stations across the country.
Conclusion
A major objection to the argument presented in this article could centre on the difficult
relationship between the former PR parties and representatives of the old regime in
2017/18. Campaigns were not always well-coordinated, and Bersatu stressed its
Malay identity in contrast to the multi-ethnic approach of DAP, PKR and Amanah.
Ideological proximity was questionable, and routinized cooperation was hardly possible
in view of old enmities and the parties’ limited experience working together. But the
replacement of PAS with Bersatu, Amanah and Warisan only motivated a tiny fraction
of voters in 2018 to abstain from voting or even from supporting the regime coalition. It
was decisive that the PH was able to include parts of the older regime forces, especially
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Mahathir, Muhyiddin (Johor), Mukhriz (Kedah), and Shafie Apdal (Sabah).67 The PH’s
cohesiveness was enhanced because electoral victory was perceived as realistic.68 More-
over, with the 2018 elections approaching, Mahathir was increasingly perceived as a
trustworthy alternative to Najib. With his unmatchable political experience and his
bold stance against the UMNO government, he was essential as a leader able to
bridge the existing divides within the coalition. In addition, the splitting of PAS, orig-
inally seen as the end of strong pre-electoral coalitions in the country, was instrumental
in enhancing coalition cohesion. Cohesiveness can be very strong even if a coalition is
mostly united by the objective of replacing an allegedly corrupt and power-obsessed
regime coalition. Ideological proximity means not only that coalition member parties
share the same major objectives, but also that these are directed towards a change of
government and regime. A cohesive pre-electoral coalition is united in its goals, and
in the methods and strategies it uses to achieve these goals.
Parties’ linkages to voters and party supporters have become stronger since 1990,
because the transformational objectives of the opposition have becoming increasingly con-
vincing and realistic. Especially the oppositionparty victories in state elections and the rela-
tively successful governments in Selangor and Penang since 2008 – including their abilities
to distribute patronage–have strengthened ties andheightened “reification”69 in theminds
of voters and supporters. The very strong position of these governments undermined the
regime propaganda directed at an allegedly incapable oppositionwhose reignwould trigger
economic havoc. In addition, opposition parties have intensified their links with civil
society networks, especially Bersih. In addition, with Mahathir (and Anwar as designated
successor), respectable leaders mitigated fears of a potentially tumultuous regime change.
Therefore, the PHwas “very strong” in relation to previous coalitions, although there were
still tensions in terms of ideology and routinization. Moreover, the strength of the PH was
not a sufficient but a necessary condition for the electoral breakthrough. Since the force of
the opposition is ultimately measured by electoral success, it is always unclear to what
extent the weakness of the regime has played a part.
The article’s comparison of various pre-electoral coalitions has illustrated the slow
strengthening of pre-electoral coalitions, despite setbacks in 1995 and 2004. It is useful
for comparisons of pre-electoral coalitions within a country, and could also be employed
for cross-country comparative studies. It has to be considered, though, that the compre-
hensiveness of the coalition in Malaysia could mean that a slightly different selection of
indicators is necessary for presidential systems or for proportional electoral systems.
Opposition coalitions should try to win as many elections as possible at the subna-
tional level and to use these power bases in order to strengthen linkages to voters and
supporters. Opposition coalitions have to cooperate closely but go their separate ways if
necessary. Demonstrations, preferably on the issue of electoral reform, can be organized
independently from political parties. Most people will understand the urgency of reform
when elections are obviously unfair. Finally, it appears to be important to recruit
esteemed politicians who were formerly members of the ruling party or coalition.
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